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Abstract
We consider a non-cooperative multi-stage game with discrete-time
state dynamics. Players have their own individual state dynamics and
each player wishes to minimize its own expected total cost. The salient
aspect of our model is that it includes ‘environment’ variables which in-
fluence the cost as well as the state dynamics of each player. The ‘envi-
ronment variables’ are identical for all players and are determined by the
decisions of all players. Hence, each player’s cost depends on the deci-
sions of the other players only through the environment variables. Here,
we provide a stochastic and dynamic generalization of what is known
as the price-taking behavior in the economics literature in which each
player chooses its decisions optimally under the (incorrect) belief that the
environment variables are generated by an independent and exogenous
stochastic process. In our setup, players observe only the past realiza-
tions of the environment variables in addition to their own state realiza-
tions and their own past decisions. At an equilibrium, defined precisely in
the paper and referred to as a subjective equilibrium, if players are given
the full distribution of the stochastic environment process as if it is an in-
dependent and exogenous process (that is, primitive, generated by nature
independently), they would have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from
their equilibrium strategies. We establish the existence of subjective equi-
libria in mixed strategies for general compact metric space models. We
study various structural properties of such equilibria in two different cases
where the state, control, disturbance, and environment variables belong
to (i) finite sets or (ii) finite dimensional Euclidian spaces. In either case,
the time-horizon can be finite as well as infinite, however, in the second
case, we assume linear dynamics and quadratic cost. In the first case, the
existence of subjective equilibrium in mixed strategies follows from the
general existence result in compact metric space models, whereas in the
second case, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of subjective
equilibrium in pure strategies. We establish the near person-by-person
optimality of a subjective equilibrium (which constitutes an approximate
Nash equilibrium) when there are large number of players (which need to
be identical players in the second case but not in the first case) and the
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environment variables are generated either by the empirical distributions
of the decisions in the first case or by the average decisions in the second
case. This result on near person-by-person optimality is also extended
to pure strategies in the first case under additional assumptions which
requires identical players.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative stochastic multi-stage game with
finite and infinite number of players and discrete-time state dynamics. Each
player’s decision at any stage is used to control the stochastic evolution of the
player’s own state dynamics. Each player’s objective is to minimize its own
expected total cost, which sums up the stage-cost incurred by the player at
each stage. The stage cost and the state evolution of each player is influenced
by the so-called environment variables in addition to the player’s own decisions
and states. The environment variables are the same across all players and are
determined as a function of all player’s decisions. Therefore, players’ problems
are coupled only through the environment variables, i.e., they are otherwise
decoupled.
Players in our model know their own individual parameters such as their set
of strategies, cost functions, discount factors, and have access to the history of
their own state and control variables as well as the environment variables. How-
ever, players neither have any information about the other players nor do they
know how the environment variables are generated. Players make the modeling
assumption that the environment variables are generated by an independent
exogenous random process with a known probability distribution. Based on
such incorrect modeling assumptions, players choose their strategies to mini-
mize their own long-term cost. Our main concern in this paper is to find player
strategies which (i) are optimal with respect to the players’ assumed models
for the environment variables, and (ii) generate environment variables whose
probability distribution is consistent with the probability distributions assumed
by all players for the environment variables. Such strategies constitute a form
of subjective equilibrium at which players cannot detect the falseness of their
modeling assumptions unless they actively probe: the environment variables
generated at a subjective equilibrium are distributionally consistent with their
beliefs when viewed in isolation as far as the marginal probability measure is
concerned, hence they would not have an incentive to deviate to an alternative
strategy.
We must emphasize that, in games with finite set of players, the notion
of subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous environment variables is
different from that of Nash equilibrium and its various refinements. At a Nash
equilibrium, each player’s beliefs of the environment is objective (in particular,
a player does not view the environment variables as exogenous), hence, each
player takes into account not only the direct effect of its decisions on its cost
but also the indirect effect of its decisions on its cost through the environment
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variables. This indirect effect through the environment variables are not taken
into account at a subjective equilibrium in which the environment variables are
viewed as exogenous.
The related notion of price-taking behavior is well known in mathematical
economics. For example, the fundamental notion of competitive equilibrium at
which the players in an exchange economy optimize their utilities with respect
to market clearing prices hinges on the assumption that the agents take the
prices as given Arrow and Debreu (1954), Radner (1968). Although the notion
of price taking behavior has been used in different settings in the literature (e.g.,
the notion of equilibrium used in Kelly (1997), Kelly et al. (1998) for commu-
nication networks), to the best of authors’ knowledge, the notion of subjective
equilibrium introduced in this paper in its full generality (with distributional
consistency) does not exist in the current literature.
The reference Green (1980) introduced a notion of subjective equilibrium,
similar to the notion of subjective equilibrium introduced in this paper, for
dynamic markets with no state dynamics and a restrictive set of strategies. The
results of Green (1980) address the questions of (i) whether Nash equilibria
include price-taking equilibria when the set of firms is a continuum, and (ii)
whether Nash equilibria in a sequence of increasingly large finite economies
approach price-taking equilibria of a non-atomic limiting economy, in particular,
they do not address the existence of subjective equilibrium in economies with a
finite set of firms. Similar issues of approximating Nash equilibria in large finite
games by the equilibria of non-atomic limiting games have been dealt with in
a number of references under the general theme of large anonymous games; see
for example Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) and Carmona and Podczeck (2020)
and the references therein.
The notion of mean-field equilibrium Lasry and Lions (2007), Huang et al.
(2006) has also a similar flavor in that the mean-field equilibria are considered
as the limit of the Nash equilibria, for each individual player, as the num-
ber of players tend to infinity. Sufficient conditions for the convergence of
Nash equilibria to mean-field equilibria (possibly along subsequences), as the
number of (nearly) identical players tend to infinity, have been presented in
Fischer (2017), Lacker (2018), Bardi and Priuli (2014), Lasry and Lions (2007),
Arapostathis et al. (2017), Sanjari and Yu¨ksel (2018, 2019), with the last two
papers focusing on identical interest games or stochastic teams. We refer in-
terested readers to Carmona and Delarue (2018), Caines et al. (2017) for a lit-
erature review and a detailed summary of some recent results on mean-field
games.
In contrast to these references where the prevailing concept is that of Nash
equilibrium, we concern ourselves in this paper with a notion of subjective equi-
librium (which generally does not coincide with Nash equilibrium when the set of
players is finite) in which the players ignore the effects of their strategies on the
environment variables (e.g., prices) due to their beliefs of exogenous uncertainty
in the environment variables.
Other relevant references include Adlakha et al. (2015), Weintraub et al.
(2011), Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel (2017), Dudebout and Shamma (2012, 2014),
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Kalai and Lehrer (1995). The notion of equilibrium introduced in Adlakha et al.
(2015), called stationary equilibrium, is based on the assumption that the play-
ers view the population states (which play the role of the environment variables
in this paper) as deterministic and constant. This equilibrium notion requires
that the constant population states assumed by the players equal the long-run
average of the actual population state (averaged over infinite number of play-
ers). If the number of players is finite or the population state is not initially
at steady-state, a player observing the actual population state can clearly re-
ject the hypothesis of a constant deterministic population state. The notion
of oblivious equilibrium utilized in Weintraub et al. (2011) is completely anal-
ogous to the stationary equilibrium in Adlakha et al. (2015). The notion of
belief distorted Nash equilibrium introduced in Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel (2017)
for a deterministic system is closer in spirit to the subjective equilibrium in
this paper and it requires players’ (probabilistic) beliefs to concentrate on the
actual deterministic play path. The notion of empirical evidence equilibrium
introduced in Dudebout and Shamma (2012, 2014) for stochastic games (with
finite state and control spaces) is also conceptually similar to the equilibrium
notion in this paper and it requires an eventual consistency between the objec-
tive and the subjective probabilities of the signal variable (environment variable
in this paper) conditioned on the assumed Markovian state for the signals. We
finally would like to cite Kalai and Lehrer (1995) as part of the relevant liter-
ature. The subjective equilibrium introduced in Kalai and Lehrer (1995) and
the one in this paper are similar but distinct concepts due to the differences
in the beliefs held by the players with regard to the nature of the environment
variables and in the requirements of consistency of the beliefs with the actual
play. While the consistency of the beliefs on the play paths, which include cor-
relations between player strategies and the environment variables, are required
in Kalai and Lehrer (1995), players in this paper ignore such correlations, which
is arguably more appropriate in applications such as the one considered below.
An application area motivating the results of this paper is the Autonomous
Demand Response (ADR) problem on price-sensitive control of energy usage
in multiple (possibly very large number of) units, e.g., Constantopoulos et al.
(1991) Roozbehani et al. (2012). In such a system, the real-time price of elec-
tricity (which would be the environment variable in our model) depends on
the total system load which includes the total power drawn by the units in the
ADR program in addition to the other consumers (not participating in the ADR
program); see Ilic´ and Galiana (1998) for ex-post and ex-ante pricing of energy.
The real-time price of electricity is also influenced by the contributions from the
renewable energy sources whose availability may vary significantly during the
day. Although, in reality, the units are facing coupled stochastic optimal control
problems, the coupling between the units is typically very weak due to the neg-
ligible effect of an individual unit’s energy usage on the price of energy. Hence,
due to lack of information and/or sophistication, the units do not consider their
own individual effects on the price of energy and behave as price takers, i.e.,
each unit assumes that the price of energy is determined by an independent
exogenous random process with an assumed probability distribution. This as-
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sumption has great simplifying power as it decouples each unit’s problem and
allows each unit to schedule its own energy usage to meet its own energy needs
and budgetary constraints based entirely on its own local information. However,
these modeling assumptions made by the units should not be contradicted by
their (common) observations of the past prices; otherwise, they would modify
their price models. This notion of consistency in the full distributional sense
leads to the notion of subjective equilibrium introduced in this paper.
We note that if the units agree to minimize the total system cost, which may
be desirable by the ADR program designer, then the deterministic version of the
problem can be solved iteratively by distributed optimization methods; see for
example Nedic and Ozdaglar (2009) Sandell et al. (1978). However, such meth-
ods would typically require the knowledge and dissemination of the gradients of
the pricing function, the updated decisions of all units, deterministic forecasts
for the random variables, and the precise temperature dynamics, which makes
these methods impractical for the considered, inherently stochastic, ADR appli-
cation. In this context, we should also point out the recent paper Singh et al.
(2018) which considers the problem of balancing energy generation and con-
sumption between multiple agents and an independent system operator while
optimizing a social welfare function through price-bid iterations.
Contributions. We introduce a subjective equilibrium concept with distri-
butional (in the sense of sequence probability measures) consistency for stochas-
tic dynamic teams. As reviewed and motivated in detail above, while related
concepts of equilibria have appeared in the literature, prior studies have only
focused on the more restrictive static or deterministic setups. In particular, our
main contribution is to introduce the concept of subjective equilibrium under
beliefs of exogenous uncertainty, which is applicable to a very general class of
problems. We obtain a general existence result on such subjective equilibria in
mixed strategies for compact metric space models. We establish further struc-
tural results in two different cases where the state, control, and environment
variables belong to (i) finite sets, and (ii) finite dimensional Euclidian spaces.
In either case, the time-horizon can be finite as well as infinite, however, in the
second case, we assume linear dynamics and quadratic cost and obtain more
constructive results. In the first case, the existence of subjective equilibrium
in mixed strategies follows from the general existence result in compact metric
space models, whereas in the second case, we derive sufficient conditions for
the existence of subjective equilibrium in pure strategies. We establish the near
person-by-person optimality of a subjective equilibrium (which constitutes an
approximate Nash equilibrium) when there is a large number of players (which
need to be identical players in the second case but not in the first case) and the
environment variables are generated either by the empirical distributions of the
decisions in the first case or by the average decisions in the second case. This
result on near person-by-person optimality is also extended to pure strategies
in the first case under additional assumptions (which requires identical players).
When the number of decision makers is infinite, in particular, we establish that
a subjective equilibrium is also a mean-field equilibrium.
Notation. N0 and N denote the nonnegative and positive integers, respec-
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tively, R denotes the real numbers, (·)′ denotes the transpose of a vector or
matrix, | · | denotes the Euclidian norm for a vector, |x|2Q := x′Qx for a vector x
and a matrix Q, A  0 denotes a nonnegative definite matrix A, whereas A ≻ 0
denotes a positive definite matrix A, A  B denotes A− B  0, P(T) denotes
the set of probability measures on the Borel sigma algebra B(T) of a topological
space T, P and E denote the probability and the expectation, respectively, (Pµ,
Eµ, Pµ|E , Eµ|E are also used to emphasize the underlying distribution µ ∈ P(T)
and the event E ∈ B(T) conditioned on), cov(·) and cov(·|·) denote the un-
conditional and conditional covariances, respectively, X ∼ N (Xˆ,Σ) denotes a
Gaussian random vector with mean Xˆ and covariance Σ, mM denotes a metric
on a metric space M1, I(·) denotes the indicator function.
2 Subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exoge-
nous uncertainty
2.1 Model and subjective equilibrium
Consider a decentralized stochastic system with a finite number of decision
makers where the i-th decision maker is referred to as DMi, i ∈ [1, N ], N ∈ N.
Time variable t ∈ [0, T ) is an integer where T ∈ N ∪ {∞} is the length of the
time horizon. Each DMi has its own state xit ∈ Xi, control input uit ∈ Ui, and
random disturbance wit ∈Wi at time t ∈ [0, T ). In addition, there are so-called
environment variables denoted by yt ∈ Y at time t ∈ [0, T ). Each DMi’s state
evolves as
xit+1 = f
i
t (x
i
t, u
i
t, yt, w
i
t), t ∈ [0, T ) (2.1)
starting from some (possibly random) initial state xi0 ∈ Xi, where f it : Xi×Ui×
Y×Wi → Xi is some function. The environment variable yt is produced by
yt =gt(x
0
t , xt, ut, ξt), t ∈ [0, T ) (2.2)
x0t+1 =f
0
t (x
0
t , xt, ut, w
0
t ), t ∈ [0, T ) (2.3)
where x0t ∈ X0 is the state of the environment dynamics at time t ∈ [0, T )
(x00 ∈ X0 is some possibly random initial state), xt = (x1t , . . . , xNt ) ∈ X :=
X1 × · · · × XN is the state of all DMs at time t ∈ [0, T ), ut = (u1t , . . . , uNt ) ∈
U := U1×· · ·×UN is the joint control input at time t ∈ [0, T ), ξt ∈ Ξ, w0t ∈W0
are random disturbances at time t ∈ [0, T ), and gt : X0 × X × U × Ξ → Y,
f0t : X
0 × X × U × W0 → X0 are some functions, t ∈ [0, T ). We assume
1 Moreover, when we speak of a Cartesian product of a countable collection of metric spaces
(Mt,mMt )t∈[0,T ), we assume that the product space M := ×t∈[0,T )Mt is equipped with the
metric
mM(a, b) :=
∑
t∈[0,T )
2−t
mMt (at, bt)
1 +mMt (at, bt)
(1.1)
for all a = (at)t∈[0,T ), b = (bt)t∈[0,T ) ∈ M. The metric mM, known as the product metric,
generates the product topology Aliprantis and Border (2006).
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throughout that each of the following sets is nonempty and metrizable:
X
0, . . . ,XN ,U1, . . . ,UN ,W0, . . . ,WN ,Y,Ξ. (2.4)
Each DMi has access to the information (Iit , Yt−1) at time t ∈ [0, T ), where
Ii0 := x
i
0, Y−1 := ∅, Iit := ((xik)k∈[0,t], (uik)k∈[0,t)), Yt−1 := (yk)k∈[0,t), t ∈ [1, T ).
A pure strategy for DMi is a collection si = (sit)t∈[0,T ) of mappings s
i
t : I
i
t ×
Y[0,t) → Ui, where Iit := (Xi)[0,t] × (Ui)[0,t), t ∈ [0, T ). We let Si denote the set
of pure strategies for each DMi. If DMi employs a pure strategy si ∈ Si, then
uit = s
i
t(I
i
t , Yt−1), t ∈ [0, T ). (2.5)
For any joint pure strategy s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S := S1×· · ·×SN employed, each
DMi incurs a long-term cost
J¯ i(si, s−i) = E
( ∑
t∈[0,T )
(βi)tcit(x
i
t, u
i
t, yt) + (β
i)T ciT (x
i
T )
)
(2.6)
where s−i ∈ S−i := ×j 6=iSj denotes the pure strategies of all DMs other than
DMi, βi ∈ [0, 1] is DMi’s discount factor (βi ∈ [0, 1) when T = ∞), cit :
Xi × Ui × Y → R is some function which determines DMi’s cost at each time
t ∈ [0, T ), and ciT : Xi → R determines DMi’s terminal cost (ciT ≡ 0 when
T = ∞). The expectation in (2.6) is taken with respect to the probability
distribution over the set of state-control-environment histories ((Iit+1, Yt))t∈[0,T )
induced by s ∈ S. Note that each DMi’s cost is influenced by the other DMs
only through the environment variables (yt)t∈[0,T ).
Suppose now that each DMi views the sequence of environment variables as
an independent exogenous (that is, primitive, generated by nature indepen-
dently of the all other primitive random variables) random sequence (zt)t∈[0,T )
with a given probability distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T )) instead of the endogenous
sequence (yt)t∈[0,T ) generated by (2.1)-(2.3). We note that (zt)t∈[0,T ) need not
be a collection of independent random variables. We define DMi’s cost corre-
sponding to a pure strategy si ∈ Si and a deterministic sequence of environment
variables z¯ = (z¯t)t∈[0,T ) ∈ Y[0,T ) as
J i(si, z¯) := E
( ∑
t∈[0,T )
(βi)tcit
(
xit, u
i
t, z¯t
)
+ (βi)T ciT (x
i
T )
)
(2.7)
where
xit+1 =f
i
t (x
i
t, u
i
t, z¯t, w
i
t), t ∈ [0, T )
uit =s
i
t(I
i
t , Z¯t−1), t ∈ [0, T )
with Z¯−1 := ∅, and Z¯t−1 := (z¯0, . . . , z¯t−1), for t ∈ [1, T ). Note that the expecta-
tion in (2.7) is taken with respect to the probability distribution over the set of
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DMi’s state-control histories (Iit+1)t∈[0,T ) induced by (s
i, z¯) ∈ Si × Y[0,T ). Ac-
cordingly, each DMi who models the environment variables as an independent
exogenous random sequence with the probability distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T )) aims
to minimize EζJ
i(si, ·) by choosing a pure strategy si ∈ Si. Therefore, from
DMi’s viewpoint, no DM has any influence on the environment variables and
the cost EζJ
i(si, ·) is independent of the strategies of all DMs other than DMi.
In all cases considered in the paper, the appropriate conditions will be
imposed to ensure that the long-term cost (2.6) and (2.7) are well-defined for
any joint strategy s ∈ S and independent exogenous distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T ))
for the environment variables.
Definition 2.1. Let s = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S be a joint strategy and ζs ∈ P(Y[0,T ))
be the probability distribution of the environment variables generated by s en-
dogenously through (2.1)-(2.5). The joint strategy s is called a subjective equi-
librium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty in pure strategies, or simply a
subjective equilibrium in pure strategies, if
EζsJ
i(si, ·) ≤ EζsJ i(s˜i, ·), ∀i ∈ [1, N ], s˜i ∈ Si (2.8)
where the environment variables are (incorrectly) assumed, by each DMi, to be
an independent exogenous random sequence with the probability distribution ζs.
Note that, in a subjective equilibrium, each DMi ignores the influence of
its own strategy si on the environment variables in minimizing its long-term
cost. In contrast, the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
requires a joint pure strategy s = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S to satisfy
J¯ i(si, s−i) ≤ J¯ i(s˜i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [1, N ], s˜i ∈ Si (2.9)
where each DMi takes into account the entire influence of its own strategy si
on its long-term cost including through the environment variables.
The concepts introduced above are naturally extended to so-called mixed
strategies which are probability mixtures over the pure strategies. A mixed
strategy for DMi is a probability distribution γi ∈ P(Si) over DMi’s set of pure
strategies. We let Γi := P(Si) denote the set of mixed strategies for each DMi.
If DMi employs a mixed strategy γi ∈ Γi, then DMi makes an independent
random draw si ∈ Si according to γi and employs the pure strategy si. A
joint mixed strategy γ = (γ1, . . . , γN ) ∈ Γ := Γ1 × · · ·ΓN induces a probability
distribution over the set Y[0,T ) of environment variables defined as: for any
B ∈ B(Y[0,T )),
ζγ(B) := Eγζs(B) (2.10)
where ζs ∈ P(Y[0,T )) is the probability distribution of the environment variables
generated by s ∈ S endogenously via (2.1)-(2.5). The long-term cost of each
DMi under pure strategies is extended to mixed strategies as Eγ J¯
i or E(γi,ζ)J
i
(for an independent exogenous distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T )) for the environment
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variables). Using these expected long-term cost for each DMi, the notion of a
subjective equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium extends to mixed strategies in the
most natural way. Finally, the pure strategies in each Si can be identified with
the extreme elements of Γi each of which assigns probability one to a single
element of Si.
2.2 Existence of subjective equilibria in mixed strategies
In this section, we consider the general setup introduced in Section 2.1. Our goal
is to establish the existence of subjective equilibrium in mixed strategies when
all state, control, disturbance, and environment variables belong to compact
metric spaces.
Assumption 2.1.
1. Each of the sets X0, . . . ,XN ,U1, . . . ,UN ,W0, . . . ,WN ,Y,Ξ is a compact
metric space
2. For all (i, t) ∈ [0, N ]× [0, T ], cit, f it , gt are continuous (if defined)
3. For all i ∈ [1, N ], Si = ×t∈[0,T )Sit where, for each t ∈ [0, T ), Sit is a
compact metric space of mappings from Iit × Y[0,t) to Ui
4. sup(i,t,xi,ui,y)∈[1,N ]×[0,T ]×Xi×Ui×Y |cit(xi, ui, y)| < ∞ and supi∈[1,N ] βi < 1
.
Condition (1) of Assumption 2.1 is satisfied by finite sets equipped with the
discrete metric, in which case Condition (2) is satisfied by all functions cit, f
i
t ,
gt and Condition (3) is satisfied for each S
i
t by all mappings from I
i
t × Y[0,t)
to Ui. Note that the functions cit, f
i
t , gt satisfying Condition (2) are uniformly
continuous (in their compact domains of definition). Condition (3) is more
generally satisfied, for example, by the space of Lipschitz continuous functions
from Iit × Y[0,t) to Ui with a uniform Lipschitz constant equipped with the
sup-metric2. Condition (4) implies that any DMi’s long-term cost is uniformly
bounded, i.e., sup(i,si,z)∈[1,N ]×Si×YT |J i(si, z)| <∞, which will be needed in the
case T =∞.
We now turn to the question of existence of subjective equilibrium in mixed
strategies. If DMi faces an independent exogenous distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T ))
for the environment variables, DMi’s set of best replies to ζ in mixed strategies
are defined as
BRi(ζ) := {γi ∈ Γi : E(γi,ζ)J i ≤ E(γ˜i,ζ)J i, ∀γ˜i ∈ Γi}.
We now introduce the correspondence BR = (BR
1
, . . . , BR
N
) : Γ⇒ Γ defined
by
BR
i
(γ) = BRi(ζγ), ∀i ∈ [1, N ].
2m
Sit
(sit, s¯
i
t) = sup(Iit ,Yt−1)∈I
i
t×Y
[0,t) mUi (s
i
t(I
i
t , Yt−1), s¯
i
t(I
i
t , Yt−1)), for any s
i
t, s¯
i
t ∈ S
i
t.
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Clearly, a mixed strategy profile γ ∈ Γ is a subjective equilibrium if and only if
γ is a fixed point of BR.
Theorem 2.1. Consider the compact metric space model of this section, under
Assumption 2.1. There exists a subjective equilibrium in mixed strategies. If
there are sets of identical3 DMs, there exists a symmetric subjective equilibrium
in mixed strategies γ ∈ Γ such that identical DMs have identical strategies at γ,
i.e., γi = γj, if DMi and DMj are identical.
Proof. Proof We will verify that the mapping BR : Γ ⇒ Γ satisfies the condi-
tions of Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem Fan (1952), Glicksberg (1952) and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991):
1. Γ is a compact, convex, nonempty subset of a locally convex topological
vector space.
2. BR(γ) is nonempty for all γ.
3. BR(γ) is convex for all γ.
4. BR(·) has a closed graph, i.e., if (γn, γˇn)→ (γ, γˇ) with γˇn ∈ BR(γn), then
γˇ ∈ BR(γ).
We now verify each of these conditions. The set Si of pure strategies for any
DMi is a countable product of the compact metric spaces (Sit)t∈[0,T ), hence S
i
a compact4 space metrizable by the product metric in (1.1). This implies that
the set Γi of mixed strategies is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of a locally
convex topological vector space, namely the space of finite signed Borel measures
on Si endowed with the weak topology5; see Theorem 6.4 in Parthasarathy et al.
(2014). Hence, the first condition holds.
The mapping (si, z) 7→ J i(si, z) is continuous in Si×Y[0,T ) under the product
topology. When T ∈ N, this follows from the uniform continuity of the functions
ci0, . . . , c
i
T , f
i
0, . . . , f
i
T−1 and the uniform equi-continuity
6 of the mappings in
S
i
0, . . . , S
i
T−1. When T =∞, due to Assumption 2.1, for any ǫ > 0, there exists
3DMi and DMj are considered identical if BRi(ζ) = BRj(ζ), for all ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T )).
4The cartesian product of any nonempty collection of compact spaces is compact in the
product topology due to the Tychnonoff Theorem.
5The weak topology is the coarsest topology under which the mappings γi 7→ Eγif are
continuous for any bounded continuous function f : Si → R.
6The uniform equi-continuity of the mappings in Sit means that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists
δ > 0 such that, for all (Iit , Zt−1) ∈ I
i
t × Y
[0,t) and sit ∈ S
i
t,
m
Iit×Y
[0,t) ((I
i
t , Zt−1) , (I¯
i
t , Z¯t−1)) < δ ⇒ mUi (s
i
t(I
i
t , Zt−1) , s
i
t(I¯
i
t , Z¯t−1)) < ǫ.
The uniform equi-continuity of the mappings in Sit follows from the compactness of I
i
t×Y
[0,t)
as well as Sit via the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem Dudley (2002).
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Tǫ/4 ∈ N such that, the long-term cost incurred over the horizon t ∈ [Tǫ/4,∞),
under any (si, z) ∈ Si × Y[0,T ), satisfies∣∣∣∣∣E
( ∑
t∈[Tǫ/2,∞)
(βi)tcit
(
xit, u
i
t, zt
))∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ/4 (2.11)
and in addition there exists δ > 0 such that
mSi×Y[0,T)((s
i, z), (s¯i, z¯)) < δ ⇒ |J iTǫ/4(si, z)− J iTǫ/4(s¯i, z¯)| < ǫ/2
where J iTǫ/4(s
i, z) represents DMi’s (truncated) cost incurred over the horizon
t ∈ [0, Tǫ/4) corresponding to (si, z). This implies the continuity of the mapping
(si, z) 7→ J i(si, z) in Si × Y[0,T ). Since the mapping (si, z) 7→ J i(si, z) is also
bounded in Si ×Y[0,T ) due to Assumption 2.1, the mapping (γi, ζ) 7→ E(γi,ζ)J i
is continuous in Γi ×P(Y[0,T )) under the weak topology. The second condition
now follows from the fact that each BR
i
(γ) is the set of minimizers of the
continuous function E(·,ζγ)J
i over the nonempty compact set Γi.
For any ζ ∈ P(Y[0,T )), the mapping γi 7→ E(γi,ζ)J i is clearly convex, which
implies the third condition.
To verify the fourth condition, assume that (γn, γˇn) → (γ, γˇ) with γˇn ∈
BR(γn), but γˇ 6∈ BR(γ). This means that, for some i ∈ [1, N ], γ˜i ∈ Γi, ǫ > 0, we
have E(γ˜i,ζγ)J
i < E(γˇi,ζγ)J
i−3ǫ. We note that the mapping (s˜i, s) 7→ E(s˜i,ζs)J i,
where E(s˜i,ζs)J
i = EζsJ
i(s˜i, ·), is continuous and bounded in Si × S due to
Assumption 2.1, in particular, due to (2.11) and the uniform equi-continuity of
the mappings in each Si. This implies the continuity of the mapping (γ˜i, γ) 7→
E(γ˜i,ζγ)J
i in Γi × Γ because, for any ǫ > 0,
|E(γ˜i,γ)E(s˜i,ζs)J i − E(γˆi,γ¯)E(s˜i,ζs)J i| < ǫ ⇒ |E(γ˜i,ζγ)J i − E(γˆi,ζγ¯)J i| < ǫ
where the inner expectation in E(γ˜i,γ)E(s˜i,ζs)J
i is with respect to the distri-
bution ζs induced by a fixed pure strategy profile s ∈ S (recall E(s˜i,ζs)J i =
EζsJ
i(s˜i, ·)) and the outer expectation is with respect to the probability distri-
bution (γ˜i, γ) over the set Si × S of pure strategies. Therefore, for sufficiently
large n ∈ N, we have
E(γ˜i,ζγn )J
i − ǫ < E(γ˜i,ζγ)J i < E(γˇi,ζγ)J i − 3ǫ < E(γˇin,ζγn )J i − 2ǫ.
This contradicts γˇin ∈ BR
i
(γn); hence, the fourth condition also holds. Fan-
Glicksberg’s fixed theorem now implies the existence of a subjective equilibrium
in mixed strategies.
If there are sets of identical DMs, the existence of a symmetric subjec-
tive equilibrium in mixed strategies can be shown similarly by applying Fan-
Glicksberg’s fixed theorem on the correspondence γ 7→ (BR1(ζγ), . . . , BRN(ζγ))
where γ ∈ Γ is restricted in such a way that identical DMs have identical strate-
gies at γ.
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A behavior strategy for DMi is a collection bi = (bit)t∈[0,T ) of functions such
that bit : I
i
t × Y[0,T ) → P(Ui), for all t ∈ [0, T ). If DMi employs a behavior
strategy bi, then DMi makes an independent draw ui ∈ Ui at each time t ∈ [0, T )
according to bit(I
i
t , Yt−1) and implements u
i
t = u
i. It is well known that, in
extensive games with imperfect information such as the games considered in
this paper, if the perfect recall condition holds, i.e., each DMi never forgets any
information, then every mixed strategy has an equivalent behavior strategies;
see Kuhn (1953) for the finite case and Aumann (1961) for the infinite case.
More precisely, given a mixed strategy γi ∈ Γi for DMi, an (essentially unique)
equivalent behavior strategy can be defined as: for all t ∈ [0, T ), (Iit , Yt−1) ∈
Iit × Y[0,T ), Bi ∈ B(Ui),
bit(I
i
t , Yt−1)(B
i) := Pγi
(
sit(I
i
t , Yt−1) ∈ Bi | si ∈ Rit(Iit , Yt−1)
)
(2.12)
where Rit denotes the set of DM
i’s pure strategies consistent with (Iit , Yt−1), i.e.,
Rit(I
i
t , Yt−1) := {si ∈ Si : sik(Iik, Yk−1) = uik, k ∈ [0, t)}
provided that Pγi(R
i
t(I
i
t , Yt−1)) > 0. When Pγi(R
i
t(I
i
t , Yt−1)) = 0, the history
(Iit , Yt−1) arises with zero probability under γ
i (regardless of the strategies em-
ployed by the other DMs) in which case the definition of bit(I
i
t , Yt−1) is arbitrary.
It is straightforward to verify that a mixed strategy profile
γ = (γ1, . . . , γN) ∈ Γ and its equivalent behavior strategy b = (b1, . . . , bN )
defined by (2.12) induce the same probability distribution over the histories
(I1t+1, . . . , I
N
t+1, Yt)t∈[0,T ). Similarly, (s
i, z) ∈ Si × Y[0,T ) and its equivalent
(bi, z) induce the same probability distribution over the histories (Iit+1)t∈[0,T ).
This leads to the following corollary to Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.1. Consider the compact metric space model of this section under
Assumption 2.1. There exists a subjective equilibrium in behavior strategies. If
there are sets of identical DMs, there exists a symmetric subjective equilibrium
in behavior strategies b such that identical DMs have identical strategies at b.
3 Finite space models
In this section, we consider a specialization of the compact metric space model
of the previous section to the case where all state, control, disturbance, and
environment variables belong to finite sets.
3.1 Anonymous games
As the notion of a subjective equilibrium is different from that of a Nash equi-
librium, the long-term cost of each DM at a subjective equilibrium need not
be optimal given the strategies of the other DMs. However, in games where
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DMs interact anonymously, this optimality gap arising at a subjective equilib-
rium vanishes asymptotically as the number of DMs grow unboundedly. We
will refer to a game as an anonymous game (see Blonski (2000), Adlakha et al.
(2015) for the case of finite set of players and Mas-Colell (1984), Schmeidler
(1973), Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) for the case of non-atomic set of play-
ers) if the set of states and control inputs available to each DM is identical, i.e.,
(Xi × Ui) = (X1 × U1), for all i ∈ [1, N ], and the environment variable yt at
each time t ∈ [0, T ) depends on the state-control variables through the empirical
distribution dt ∈ P(X1 × U1) defined as
dt(y, v) =
1
N
∑
i∈[1,N ]
I((xit, u
i
t) = (y, v)), t ∈ [0, T ), (y, v) ∈ X1 × U1. (3.1)
More precisely, in an anonymous game, the equations (2.2)-(2.3) generating the
environment variables take the form
yt =gt(x
0
t , dt, ξt), t ∈ [0, T ) (3.2)
x0t+1 =f
0
t (x
0
t , dt, w
0
t ), t ∈ [0, T ) (3.3)
where gt : X
0×P(X1×U1)×Ξ→ Y, f0t : X0×P(X1×U1)×W0 → X0, t ∈ [0, T ).
Intuitively, in an anonymous game with a large number of DMs, the influence
of an individual DM on the environment variables hence the long-term cost of
the other DMs would be negligible under certain conditions.
To state our results precisely, we now consider a sequence of (GN )N∈N
of anonymous games, where the number of DMs in GN is N ∈ N. For
ease of notation, we assume that all games in (GN)N∈N share the com-
mon data (T,Y,X0,W0,Ξ, (f0t )t∈[0,T ), (gt)t∈[0,T )). Also, for any N ∈ N,
the games GN ,GN+1, . . . share the data specific to DM1,...,DMN , that
is, (Xi,Ui,Wi, (f it )t∈[0,T ), (c
i
t)t∈[0,T ], β
i)i∈[1,N ] are the same in the games
GN ,GN+1, . . . . In addition, since (GN)N∈N are anonymous games,
(Xi × Ui) = (X1 × U1), Si = S1, and Γi = Γ1, for all i ∈ [1, N ]. The
probability distributions of the random variables in (GN )N∈N are arbitrary at
this point.
Assumption 3.1.
1. Each of the sets X0, . . . ,XN ,U1, . . . ,UN ,W0, . . . ,WN ,Y,Ξ is a finite set
2. sup(i,t,xi,ui,p)∈N×[0,T ]×Xi×Ui×Y |cit(xi, ui, p)| <∞ and supi∈N βi < 1
3. The functions gt(x
0, ·, ξ) and f0t (x0, ·, w0) are continuous in P(X1 × U1),
uniformly with respect to all (t, x0, ξ, w0) ∈ [0, T )×X0×Ξ×W0, i.e., there
exists ρ > 0 such that, for all (t, x0, ξ, w0) ∈ [0, T )× X0 × Ξ×W0,
mP(X1×U1)(d, d¯) < ρ ⇒ gt(x0, d, ξ) = gt(x0, d¯, ξ) and f0t (x0, d, w0) = f0t (x0, d¯, w0)
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4. The random variables ω0, ω1, . . . , ωN defined as
ω0 := (x00, (w
0
t )t∈[0,T ), (ξt, )t∈[0,T )), ω
i := (xi0, (w
i
t)t∈[0,T )), i ∈ [1, N ]
are mutually independent in any GN , N ∈ N.
Under Assumption 3.1, Theorem 2.1 implies the existence of subjective
equilibrium in mixed strategies for the finite space model of this section. As
will be seen shortly, Conditions (3)-(4) of Assumption 3.1 imply that the
sequence of environment variables generated by a joint strategy in GN does not
change (in the sense of stochastic equivalency) when a single DM deviates to
an alternative strategy provided that the number of DMs is sufficiently large.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a sequence (GN )N∈N of anonymous games (within
the finite space model of this section) under Assumption 3.1. There exist
N¯ ∈ N such that, for N ≥ N¯ , any subjective equilibrium in GN is also a Nash
equilibrium in GN .
We will prove a generalization of Theorem 3.1 where weak dependencies be-
tween the random variables ω0, ω1, . . . , ωN are allowed, i.e., the fourth condition
in Assumption 3.1 is relaxed. Let
Ω0 :=X0 × (W0)[0,T ) × (Ξ)[0,T )
Ωi :=Xi × (Wi)[0,T ), i ∈ [1, N ]
Ω−i :=×j∈[1,N ]\{i} Ωj
Ω :=×j∈[1,N ] Ωj
Theorem 3.2. Consider a sequence (GN )N∈N of anonymous games (within the
finite- space model of this section) under Conditions (1)-(3) of Assumption 3.1.
Given ǫ > 0, there exist N¯ ∈ N (independent of ǫ) and δǫ > 0 such that if
N ≥ N¯ and sup
ωi,ω¯i∈Ωi,B∈B(Ω−i×Ω0)
|P (B|ωi)− P (B|ω¯i)| ≤ δǫ (3.4)
then any subjective equilibrium γ ∈ Γ in GN is also an ǫ−Nash equilibrium in
GN , i.e.,
E(γi,γ−i)J¯
i ≤ E(γ˜i,γ−i)J¯ i + ǫ, ∀ i ∈ [1, N ], γ˜i ∈ Γi. (3.5)
Furthermore, (3.5) holds with ǫ = 0, if (3.4) holds with δ0 = 0.
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Proof. Proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 It suffices to show that, given ǫ > 0, there
exist N¯ ∈ N (independent of ǫ) and δǫ > 0 such that if (3.4) holds, then, for all
i ∈ [1, N ], γ˜i ∈ Γi, γ ∈ Γ,
|Eγ˜i,ζγJ i − Eγ˜i,γ−iJ¯ i| ≤ ǫ/2. (3.6)
The probability of any (Iit , Zt−1) ∈ Iit × Y[0,T ), t ∈ [0, T ), under (γ˜i, ζγ) ∈
Γi × P(Y[0,T )), where ζγ is independent and exogenous, is given by
P(γ˜i,γ−i)(I
i
t , Zt−1) = Eγ˜i
(
I{ωi ∈ B−1si,Zt−1(Iit )}
)
ζγ(Zt−1)
where B−1si,Zt−1(I
i
t ) denotes the set of ω
i ∈ Ωi such that (si, Zt−1, ωi) yields Iit .
The probability of any (Iit , Zt−1) ∈ Iit × Y[0,T ), t ∈ [0, T ), under (γ˜i, γ−i) ∈ Γ is
given by
P(γ˜i,γ−i)(I
i
t , Zt−1) = Eγ˜i
(
I{ωi ∈ B−1si,Zt−1(Iit )}ζ(si,γ−i)|ωi(Zt−1)
)
where
ζ(si,γ−i)|ωi(Zt−1) := Eγ−iP (B
−1
(si,ωi,s−i)(Zt−1)|ωi)
and B−1(si,ωi,s−i)(Zt−1) denotes the set of (ω
−i, ω0) ∈ Ω−i × Ω0 such that
(si, ωi, s−i, ω−i, ω0) yields Zt−1. We write, for any (s
i, ωi) ∈ Si × Ωi,
ζγ(Zt−1)− ζ(si,γ−i)|ωi(Zt−1) = Eγi
(
ζ(si,γ−i)|ωi(Zt−1)
)− ζ(si,γ−i)|ωi(Zt−1).
Note that if the joint state-control variables (xt, ut) and (x¯t, u¯t) agree for all
but one DM, then the corresponding empirical distributions dt and d¯t, respec-
tively, can differ by at most 1/N for any coordinate (y, v). Therefore, due to the
third condition of Assumption 3.1, there exists N¯ ∈ N (independent of ǫ) such
that if N ≥ N¯ , then, for any i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [0, T ), (si, ωi), (s¯i, ω¯i) ∈ Si × Ωi,
s−i ∈ S−i, Zt−1 ∈ Y[0,T ), we have
B−1(si,ωi,s−i)(Zt−1) = B
−1
(s¯i,ω¯i,s−i)(Zt−1)
which implies
ζ(si,γ−i)|ωi(Zt−1)− ζ(s¯i,γ−i)|ω¯i(Zt−1)
= Eγ−iP (B
−1
(si,ωi,s−i)(Zt−1)|ωi)− Eγ−iP (B−1(si,ωi,s−i)(Zt−1)|ω¯i).
Hence, there exists δǫ > 0 such that if (3.4) holds, then
sup
t∈[0,T ),(Iit ,Zt−1)∈I
i
t×Y
[0,T)
|P(γ˜i,ζγ)(Iit , Zt−1)− P(γ˜i,γ−i)(Iit , Zt−1)| (3.7)
is sufficiently small that (3.6) holds.
If (3.4) holds with δ0 = 0, then the quantity in (3.7) vanishes and (3.6) holds
with ǫ = 0. Then, Theorem 3.1 follows as a special case.
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Remark 3.1. Theorem 2.1 established the existence of subjective equilibrium
in mixed strategies (for the compact metric space model) with arbitrary depen-
dencies between the primitive random variables. In Theorem 3.1 and 3.2, we
focused on anonymous games where the environment variables depend on the
state and control variables of all DMs through the empirical distributions of
these variables over the set X1 × U1, which is common across all DMs. Note
that our definition of an anonymous game does not require DMs to be identical.
In the finite horizon case, if ω0, ω1, . . . , ωN are mutually independent, then
a subjective equilibrium is person-by-person optimal, i.e., a Nash equilibrium,
for large number of DMs; see Theorem 3.1. In Theorem 3.2, we allow weak
dependencies between the local random variables ω0, ω1, . . . , ωN and show that
a subjective equilibrium well approximates a Nash equilibrium for large number
of DMs. Under weak dependencies between the local random variables, the
optimality gap for each individual DM vanishes as the number of DMs grow
unboundedly in anonymous games.
Under additional assumptions, it is possible to show the existence of
ǫ−subjective equilibrium in pure strategies in large anonymous games with iden-
tical DMs. These pure strategies, however, can be different for different DMs,
i.e., they need not constitute a symmetric ǫ−subjective equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a sequence (GN )N∈N of anonymous games (within
the finite space model of this section) with identical DMs under Assump-
tion 3.1. Assume further that the environment variables (yt)t∈[0,T ) are
generated by deterministic dynamics driven by the random inputs (dt)t∈[0,T ),
i.e., P (ω0 = ω¯0) = 1, for some ω¯0 ∈ Ω0. Given ǫ > 0, there exists Nǫ ∈ N such
that, for N ≥ Nǫ, GN possess an ǫ−subjective equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Proof Consider the case T ∈ N. By Theorem 2.1, GN possesses a sym-
metric subjective equilibrium γ∗,N = (γ1,N , · · · , γN,N) ∈ Γ, where γ1,N = · · · =
γN,N and the second index N in the superscript is to make the dependence on
the number of DMs explicit. Let dNt and y
N
t denote the empirical distributions
of (xit, u
i
t) and the environment variable at time t ∈ [0, T ) generated in GN (by
some joint strategy), respectively. Let d¯Nt and y¯
N
t , t ∈ [0, T ), be generated by
y¯Nt =gt(x¯
0
t , d¯
N
t , ξ¯t)
x¯0t+1 =f
0
t (x¯
0
t , d¯
N
t , w¯
0
t )
d¯Nt+1 =Eγ∗,N |ENt d
N
t+1
where
ENt ={(s, ω) ∈ S× Ω : (s, ω, ω¯0)→ yNk = y¯Nk , ∀k ∈ [0, t]}
with x¯0t = x
0
t and d¯
N
0 = Eγ∗,Nd
N
0 , provided Pγ∗,N (ENT−1) > 0, which will be the
case for sufficiently large N ∈ N. We will show that
lim
N→∞
Pγ∗,N (ENT−1) = 1. (3.8)
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Since ((xi0, u
i
0))i∈[1,N ] generated in G
N by γ∗,N are mutually independent
and identically distributed, the law of large numbers implies that, for any δ ∈
(0, 1),
lim
N→∞
Pγ∗,N (mP(X1×U1)(d
N
0 , d¯
N
0 ) < δ) = 1. (3.9)
Note that the distribution generating the samples I{(xi0, ui0) = (y, v)} may
change with N ; however, this causes no difficulty in the application of the law
of large numbers above or below as Chebyshev’s inequality implies
Pγ∗,N (|dN0 (y, v)−d¯N0 (y, v)| ≥ δ) ≤
1
Nδ2
Eγ∗,N |I{(xi0, ui0) = (y, v)}−d¯N0 (y, v)|2 ≤
1
Nδ2
.
By Assumption 3.1, (3.9) implies that
lim
N→∞
Pγ∗,N (EN0 ) = 1. (3.10)
On EN0 , yN0 is deterministic (and equals y¯N0 ), hence, ((xi1, ui1))i∈[1,N ] gener-
ated in GN by γ∗,N are mutually independent and identically distributed across
i ∈ [1, N ]. Therefore, the law of large numbers implies that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
lim
N→∞
Pγ∗,N |EN0 (mP(X1×U1)(d
N
1 , d¯
N
1 ) < δ) = 1.
Hence, by Assumption 3.1, we have
lim
N→∞
Pγ∗,N |EN0 (y
N
1 = y¯
N
1 ) = 1. (3.11)
From (3.10)-(3.11), we obtain
lim
N→∞
Pγ∗,N (EN1 ) = 1.
Continuing along the same lines leads to (3.8).
Consider now a pure joint strategy s∗,N = (s1,N , . . . , sN,N) ∈ S (not neces-
sarily symmetric) where the empirical distributions of s1,N , . . . , sN,N approxi-
mates γ1,N within 1/N . More precisely, let (s1,N , . . . , sN,N) ∈ S be such that
γ1,N(si,N ) > 0, i ∈ [1, N ], and
max
s1∈S1
∣∣∣∣ 1N |IN (s1)| − γ1,N (s1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1N (3.12)
where IN (s1) := {i ∈ [1, N ] : si,N = s1}. Such (s1,N , . . . , sN,N) ∈ S can be
constructed as follows. Enumerate the pure strategies in S1 as (s11, . . . , s
1
|S1|).
Let k0 := 0, and define kj , j ∈ [1, |S1|], recursively, as
kj :=
⌊
N
j∑
n=1
γ1,N (s1n) + 1/2
⌋
−
j−1∑
n=0
kn, j ∈ [1, |S1|]
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where ⌊·⌋ denotes the integer floor. We have k1, . . . , k|S1| ≥ 0 and
∑|S1|
j=1 kj = N .
Set
sk0+···+kj−1+n,N =s1j , if n ∈ [1, kj ], j ∈ [1, |S1|].
The joint pure strategy (s1,N , . . . , sN,N) ∈ S thus constructed satisfies (3.12).
We next show that
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N (ENT−1) = 1. (3.13)
We have, for any t ∈ [0, T ), (y, v) ∈ X1 × U1,
dNt (y, v) =
∑
s1∈S1:|IN(s1)|>0
|IN (s1)|
N
1
|IN (s1)|
∑
i∈IN (s1)
I
{
(xit, u
i
t) = (y, v)
}
.
(3.14)
In addition, for any s1 ∈ S1, ((xi0, ui0))i∈IN (s1) generated in GN by s∗,N are
mutually independent and identically distributed. The law of large numbers
implies that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), (y, v) ∈ X1 × U1, s1 ∈ S1, j ∈ IN (s1),
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N
(∣∣∣∣ 1|IN (s1)|
∑
i∈IN (s1)
I
{
(xi0, u
i
0) = (y, v)
}−P ((xj0, sj0(xj0)) = (y, v))
∣∣∣∣ < δ
)
= 1.
(3.15)
Using (3.12), (3.14), (3.15), we obtain, for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N (mP(X1×U1)(d
N
0 , d¯
N
0 ) < δ) = 1.
By Assumption 3.1, this implies
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N (EN0 ) = 1. (3.16)
On EN0 , yN0 generated by s∗,N is deterministic (and equals y¯N0 ), hence, for
any s1 ∈ S1, ((xi1, ui1))i∈I(s1) generated by s∗,N are mutually independent and
identically distributed. The law of large numbers implies that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
(y, v) ∈ X1 × U1, s1 ∈ S1, j ∈ IN (s1),
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N |EN0
(∣∣∣∣ 1|IN (s1)|
∑
i∈IN (s1)
I
{
(xi1, u
i
1) = (y, v)
}−Ps∗,N |EN0 ((xj1, uj1) = (y, v))
∣∣∣∣ < δ
)
= 1.
(3.17)
Using (3.12), (3.14), (3.17), we obtain, for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N |EN0 (mP(X1×U1)(d
N
1 , d¯
N
1 ) < δ) = 1. (3.18)
By Assumption 3.1, this implies
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N |EN0 (y
N
1 = y¯
N
1 ) = 1.
From (3.16)-(3.18), we obtain
lim
N→∞
Ps∗,N (EN1 ) = 1.
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Continuing along the same lines leads to (3.13).
Recall that γ∗,N ∈ Γ is a subjective equilibrium. Therefore, Eζ
γ∗,N
J i(si, ·) ≤
Eζ
γ∗,N
J i(s˜i, ·), for all i ∈ [1, N ], si, s˜i ∈ Si satisfying γi,N (si) > 0. In view of
(3.8), (3.12), (3.13), for any ǫ > 0, there exists NT,ǫ ∈ N such that if N ≥ NT,ǫ,
then, for all i ∈ [1, N ], si, s˜i ∈ Si satisfying γi,N (si) > 0, we have
J i(si, p¯N) ≤ J i(s˜i, p¯N ) + ǫ/2
J i(si,N , p¯N) ≤ J i(s˜i, p¯N ) + ǫ/2
J i(si,N , ζs∗,N ) ≤ J i(s˜i, ζs∗,N ) + ǫ
where p¯N := (y¯Nt )t∈[0,T ).
Consider the case T = ∞. By Assumption 3.1, for any ǫ > 0, there exists
Tǫ/4 ∈ N such that, the long-term cost incurred over the horizon t ∈ [Tǫ/4,∞),
under any (si, z) ∈ Si × Y[0,T ), satisfies∣∣∣∣∣E
( ∑
t∈[Tǫ/4,∞)
(βi)tcit
(
xit, u
i
t, zt
))∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ/4. (3.19)
For any N ≥ NTǫ/4,ǫ/4, the finite-horizon game obtained by restricting GN to
the time interval t ∈ [0, Tǫ/4) has an (ǫ/4)−subjective equilibrium s∗,N ∈ S.
Now, any pure strategy obtained by arbitrarily extending s∗,N to the infinite
horizon t ∈ [0,∞) would be an ǫ−subjective equilibrium in pure strategies.
Remark 3.2. The assumption of identical DMs in Theorem 3.3 can be relaxed
to different sets of identical DMs (DMs in different sets need not be identical)
so long as the number of identical DMs within each set in GN grows without
bound as N →∞.
The fourth condition of Assumption 3.1, namely the independence of the
local random variables ω0, ω1, . . . , ωN , can also be relaxed as long as the weak
law of large numbers apply to the samples ((xit, u
i
t))i∈IN (s1), for each s
1 ∈ S1
and t ∈ [0, T ), as N →∞.
3.2 Anonymous games with countably infinite set of DMs
We introduce an anonymous game with a countably infinite set of DMs, denoted
by G∞, based on a sequence (GN)N∈N of anonymous games where the number
of DMs in GN is N ∈ N (see Subsection 3.1). We consider finite as well as
infinite time horizons, i.e., T ∈ N ∪ {∞}. The long-term cost of DMi, i ∈ N, in
G∞ corresponding to a joint mixed strategy γ = (γj)j∈N is defined by
J¯ i,∞(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
E(γ1,...,γN)J¯
i,N
where E(γ1,...,γN)J¯
i,N denotes the long-term cost of DMi in GN , N ∈ [i,∞),
corresponding to the joint mixed strategy (γj)j∈[1,N ]. A joint strategy (γ¯
j)j∈N ∈
19
(Γ1)N satisfying J¯ i,∞(γ¯i, γ¯−i) ≤ J¯ i,∞(γi, γ¯−i), for all i ∈ N, γi ∈ Γ1, constitutes
a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in G∞. The goal of this subsection is to
show that (some of) the Nash equilibria in G∞ can be obtained as the limiting
subjective equilibria in (GN )N∈N as N →∞. We first relax (Condition (4)) of
Assumption 3.1.
Assumption 3.2. In addition to Conditions (1)-(3) of Assumption 3.1, assume
that, for some positive-valued sequence (ǫN )N∈N satisfying limN→∞ ǫN = 0 and
all sufficiently large N ∈ N,
sup
ωi,ω¯i∈Ωi,B∈B
(
×j∈[0,N ]\{i}Ωj
) |P (B|ωi)− P (B|ω¯i)| ≤ δǫN
where δǫN is as in Theorem 3.2.
Under Assumption 3.2, for all sufficiently large N ∈ N, any subjective equi-
librium γ∗,N ∈ (Γ1)[1,N ] in GN is also an ǫN−Nash equilibrium in GN due to
Theorem 3.2. By an abuse of notation, let us view γ∗,N = (γ1,N , . . . , γN,N)
as an element of (Γ1)N, i.e., γ∗,N = (γ1,N , . . . , γN,N , . . . ) where γi,N , i > N ,
is arbitrary. Because (Γ1)N is a compact metric space, every such sequence
(γ∗,N)N∈N has a subsequence converging to a limit point in (Γ
1)N.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a sequence (GN )N∈N of anonymous games (within
the finite-state-control-disturbance-environment system of this section) under
Assumption 3.2. Let (γ∗,N )N∈N be such that γ
∗,N is a subjective equilibrium
in mixed strategies in GN . Any limit point of (γ∗,N )N∈N in (Γ
1)N is a Nash
equilibrium in G∞.
Proof. Proof Let γ∗,∞ ∈ (Γ1)N be a limit point of (γ∗,N)N∈N (where γ∗,N =
(γi,N )i∈N, N ∈ N ∪ {∞}). By Theorem 3.2, for any sufficiently large N ∈ N,
E(γi,N ,γ−i,N)J¯
i,N ≤ E(γ˜i,γ−i,N )J¯ i,N + ǫN , ∀ i ∈ [1, N ], γ˜i ∈ Γi.
For any N ∈ N, J¯ i,N is a bounded continuous function in (S1)[1,N ], hence the
mapping γ 7→ Eγ J¯ i,N is continuous in (Γ1)[1,N ] under the weak topology. This
implies, for any sufficiently large N ∈ N,
E(γi,∞,γ−i,∞)J¯
i,N ≤ E(γ˜i,γ−i,∞)J¯ i,N + ǫN , ∀ i ∈ [1, N ], γ˜i ∈ Γi.
Letting N →∞ results in
J¯ i,∞(γ∗,∞) ≤ J¯ i,∞(γ˜i, γ−i,∞), ∀ i ∈ N, γ˜i ∈ Γi.
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4 Linear quadratic systems
In this section, we again consider the setup introduced in Section 2.1 and focus
on the special case of linear quadratic systems to obtain more explicit results.
All state, control, disturbance, and environment variables are assumed to be
finite-dimensional real vectors, i.e., each of the sets in (2.4) is assumed to be a
finite-dimensional Euclidian space. Each DMi has linear state dynamics
xit+1 = A
i
tx
i
t +B
i
tu
i
t + C
i
tyt + w
i
t
and quadratic cost functions
cit(x
i, ui, y) = |xi|2Qit + |u
i|2Rit + 2y
′(Kitu
i + Litx
i)
where Ait, B
i
t , C
i
t , Q
i
t ≻ 0, Rit ≻ 0, Kit , Lit are appropriate dimensional matrices
(Kit , L
i
t are symmetric matrices), for all i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [0, T ). Each DMi has
also a quadratic terminal cost function ciT (x
i) = |xi|2
QiT
, where QiT ≻ 0, when
T ∈ N. The environment variables are generated by the linear dynamics
x0t+1 =A
0
tx
0
t +
1
N
∑
i∈[1,N ]
(B1,it u
i
t +B
2,i
t x
i
t) + w
0
t
yt =Dtx
0
t +
1
N
∑
i∈[1,N ]
(E1,it u
i
t + E
2,i
t x
i
t) + ξt
where A0t , B
1,i
t , B
2,i
t , Dt, E
1,i
t ,E
2,i
t are appropriate dimensional matrices, for all
i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [0, T ). In order to accommodate stationary subjective equilibria,
we adopt a slightly generalized model for the environment variables in this sec-
tion where an environment variable y−1 ∈ Y, which is an exogenously generated
primitive random variable, is observed by each DMi at time t = 0. Thus, each
DMi’s environment information Yt−1 at any time t ∈ [0, T ) includes y−1, i.e.,
Yt−1 = (yt)k∈[−1,t).
Assumption 4.1. (y−1, X0),W0,W1, . . . , ξ0, ξ1, . . . , are mutually independent
and have finite second-order moments where Xt := (x
i
t)i∈[0,N ], Wt := (w
i
t)i∈[0,N ]
(y−1 and X0 need not be independent).
We show below how to construct a subjective equilibrium in pure strategies
under certain conditions.
4.1 Finite horizon case (T ∈ N)
Suppose that DMi instead aims to minimize EζJ
i(si, ·) over the set of pure
strategies Si for an independent exogenous sequence (zt)t∈[−1,T ) of environment
variables with a given probability distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[−1,T )). If Assumption 4.1
holds and maxt∈[−1,T )E(|zt|2) <∞, an optimal strategy minimizing EζJ i(si, ·)
over si ∈ Si is obtained as
sit(I
i
t , Zt−1) =F
i
tx
i
t +
∑
k∈[t,T )
Git,kE(zk|Zt−1) +Hit , t ∈ [0, T )
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where (F it )t∈[0,T ), (G
i
t,k)0≤t≤k<T , (H
i
t )t∈[0,T ) are constants of appropriate di-
mensions, which are pre-computable independently of the sequence (zt)t∈[−1,T )
of environment variables; see Appendix.
Consider now a joint strategy s = (si)i∈[1,N ] ∈ S, and let ζs be the probabil-
ity distribution of the sequence (yt)t∈[−1,T ) of environment variables generated
under s, where y−1 is given. Such a joint strategy s is a subjective equilibrium
if each si minimizes EζsJ
i(si, ·), e.g., for all i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [0, T ),
sit(I
i
t , Yt−1) = F
i
t x
i
t +
∑
k∈[t,T )
Git,kE(yk|Yt−1) +Hit
where
yt =Dtx
0
t +
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
E1,jt
(
F jt x
j
t +
∑
k∈[t,T )
Gjt,kE(yk|Yt−1) +Hjt
)
+
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
E2,jt x
j
t + ξt
(4.1)
x0t+1 =A
0
tx
0
t +
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
B1,jt
(
F jt x
j
t +
∑
k∈[t,T )
Gjt,kE(yk|Yt−1) +Hjt
)
+
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
B2,jt x
j
t + w
0
t
(4.2)
xjt+1 =A
j
tx
j
t +B
j
t
(
F jt x
j
t +
∑
k∈[t,T )
Gjt,kE(yk|Yt−1) +Hjt
)
+ Cjt yt + w
j
t , j ∈ [1, N ].
(4.3)
This reveals that a subjective equilibrium exists if environment variables
(yt)t∈[−1,T ) satisfying (4.1)-(4.3) (as a random sequence), called equilibrium
environment variables, exist. We next derive conditions for the existence of
equilibrium environment variables.
We write (4.1)-(4.3) in the vector form
yt =DtXt +
∑
k∈[t,T )
Gpt,kE(yk|Yt−1) +Hpt + ξt (4.4)
Xt+1 =AtXt +
∑
k∈[t,T )
GXt,kE(yk|Yt−1) +HXt + Ctyt +Wt (4.5)
where Dt, Gpt,k, Hpt , At, GXt,k, HXt , Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ k < T , are matrices of appro-
priate dimension. For each k ∈ [0, T ) and arbitrary Xˆk|k−1, consider the linear
equations{
yˆt|k−1 = DtXˆt|k−1 +
∑
n∈[t,T ) Gpt,nyˆn|k−1 +Hpt + ξˆt
Xˆt+1|k−1 = AtXˆt|k−1 +
∑
n∈[t,T ) GXt,nyˆn|k−1 +HXt + Ctyˆt|k−1 + Wˆt
}
, t ∈ [k, T ).
(4.6)
where ξˆt := E(ξt), Wˆt := E(Wt), and yˆt|k−1, t ∈ [k, T ), are the unknowns.
We will refer to (4.6) as Eq(k, Xˆk|k−1). Evidently, the existence of equilibrium
environment variables (yt)t∈[−1,T ) requires solutions to Eq(k,E(Xk|Yk−1)),
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k ∈ [0, T ), for the unknowns yˆt|k−1, t ∈ [k, T ), which would represent the
conditional expectations E(yt|Yk−1), for t ∈ [k, T ).
Assumption 4.2. For each k ∈ [0, T ) and arbitrary Xˆk|k−1, the linear equa-
tions Eq(k, Xˆk|k−1) in (4.6) has a unique solution, which will necessarily be in
the form
yˆt|k−1 = at,k−1Xˆk|k−1 + bt,k−1, t ∈ [k, T )
where (at,k−1)t∈[k,T ) and (bt,k−1)t∈[k,T ) depend only on the constants Dt, Gpt,n,
Hpt , ξˆt, At, GXt,n, HXt , Ct, Wˆt, 0 ≤ k ≤ t ≤ n < T .
For the existence of a subjective equilibrium, it is necessary that, for each
k ∈ [0, T ) and arbitrary Yk−1 ∈ Y[−1,k), the linear equations Eq(k,E(Xk|Y−1))
has a solution (yˆt|k−1)t∈[k,T ). This indicates that Assumption 4.2 cannot be
relaxed in a significant way. Assumption 4.2 is satisfied, for example, when
the matrices E1,jt , E
2,j
t , B
1,j
t , B
2,j
t , for all j ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [1, N ], are suffi-
ciently small in size, i.e., when the sensitivity of the environment variables to the
states and decisions of DMs is sufficiently small. Note that the linear equations
Eq(k, Xˆk|k−1), for any k ∈ [0, T ), can be written as (yˆk|k−1, . . . , yˆT−1|k−1) =
Λk(yˆk|k−1, . . . , yˆT−1|k−1) + Υk, where Λk, Υk are constants of appropriate di-
mension. Furthermore, the matrices F jt , G
j
t,k, H
j
t defining each DM
j ’s optimal
controller are independent of E1,jt , E
2,j
t , B
1,j
t , B
2,j
t . Accordingly, when the ma-
trices E1,jt , E
2,j
t , B
1,j
t , B
2,j
t , for all j ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [1, N ], are sufficiently small
in size, I − Λk is invertible.
Under Assumption 4.1-4.2, let us introduce an independent exogenous se-
quence (y¯t)t∈[−1,T ) generated by the recursion, for t ∈ [0, T ),
y¯t =DtX¯t +
∑
n∈[t,T )
Gpt,n(an,t−1E(X¯t|Y¯t−1) + bn,t−1) +Hpt + ξ¯t (4.7)
X¯t+1 =AtX¯t +
∑
n∈[t,T )
GXt,n(an,t−1E(X¯t|Y¯t−1) + bn,t−1) +HXt + Cty¯t + W¯t
(4.8)
where Y¯t−1 = (y¯k)k∈[−1,t), for t ∈ [0, T ), and (y¯−1, X¯0, (ξ¯t)t∈[0,T ), (W¯t)t∈[0,T ))
has distribution identical to that of (y−1, X0, (ξt)t∈[0,T ), (Wt)t∈[0,T )). It can be
shown that the random sequence (y¯t)t∈[0,T ) generated by (4.7)-(4.8) satisfies
(4.4)-(4.5), i.e., (y¯t)t∈[0,T ) is a sequence of equilibrium environment variables.
This leads to the existence of subjective equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the finite-horizon linear quadratic problem of this sub-
section. If Assumption 4.1-4.2 hold, there exists a subjective equilibrium strategy
s ∈ S defined by
sit(x
i
t, Yt−1) = F
i
tx
i
t +G
i
t
ˆ¯Xt|t−1(Yt−1) + Hˇ
i
t , i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [0, T )
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where Git :=
∑
k∈[t,T )G
i
t,kak,t−1, Hˇ
i
t :=
∑
k∈[t,T )G
i
t,kbk,t−1 +H
i
t , and
ˆ¯Xt|t−1(·)
denotes the state estimator mapping from Y¯t−1 to E(X¯t|Y¯t−1) based on (4.7)-
(4.8). If there are sets of identical DMs, there exists a symmetric subjective
equilibrium s ∈ S such that identical DMs have identical strategies at s, i.e.,
si = sj, if DMi and DMj are identical.
Proof. Proof Consider any 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ < T and arbitrary Xˆk|k−1. The equations
Eq(k, Xˆk|k−1) for t ∈ [ℓ, T ) coincide with the equations Eq(ℓ, Xˆℓ|k−1), where
Xˆℓ|k−1 is obtained by propagating Xˆk|k−1 through (4.6). By Assumption 4.2,
this implies that, for t ∈ [ℓ, T ),
at,k−1Xˆk|k−1 + bt,k−1 = at,ℓ−1Xˆℓ|k−1 + bt,ℓ−1. (4.9)
In view of (4.9) and Assumption 4.2, one can write, for 0 ≤ k ≤ t < T ,
yˆt|k−1 =DtXˆt|k−1 +
∑
n∈[t,T )
Gpt,n(an,t−1Xˆt|k−1 + bn,t−1) +Hpt + ξˆt (4.10)
Xˆt+1|k−1 =AtXˆt|k−1 +
∑
n∈[t,T )
GXt,n(an,t−1Xˆt|k−1 + bn,t−1) +HXt + Ctyˆt|k−1 + Wˆt
(4.11)
where yˆt,k−1 = at,k−1Xˆk|k−1 + bt,k−1. Taking conditional expectations of both
sides of (4.7)-(4.8) given Y¯k−1, k ∈ [0, T ), leads to, for t ∈ [k, T ),
E(y¯t|Y¯k−1) =DtE(X¯t|Y¯k−1) +
∑
n∈[t,T )
Gpt,n(an,t−1E(X¯t|Y¯k−1) + bn,t−1) +Hpt + ξˆt
(4.12)
E(X¯t+1|Y¯k−1) =AtE(X¯t|Y¯k−1) +
∑
n∈[t,T )
GXt,n(an,t−1E(X¯t|Y¯k−1) + bn,t−1) +HXt
+ CtE(y¯t|Y¯k−1) + Wˆt (4.13)
Comparing (4.12)-(4.13) with (4.10)-(4.11) yields E(y¯t|Y¯k−1) =
at,k−1E(X¯k|Y¯k−1) + bt,k−1, for 0 ≤ k ≤ t < T . Using this in (4.7)-(4.8)
shows that the environment variables (y¯t)t∈[−1,T ) generated by (4.7)-(4.8) are
equilibrium environment variables, i.e., (y¯t)t∈[−1,T ) satisfy (4.4)-(4.5). The last
part follows from the fact that identical DMs have identical optimal responses
to any independent exogenous sequence of environment variables. This proves
the theorem.
Remark 4.1. At a subjective equilibrium, DMs model the environment vari-
ables as an independent exogenous stochastic process as in (4.7)-(4.8) where X¯t
is a replica of the system state Xt. This model for the environment variables
and the resulting distribution of the environment variables is consistent with
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the actual environment variables generated endogenously by the equilibrium
strategies. Therefore, one can start with such a model for the environment
variables (instead of an arbitrary distribution for the environment variables)
and establish the existence of a subjective equilibrium in an alternative fashion.
In the next subsection, we extend this result to infinite-horizon linear
quadratic problems.
4.2 Infinite horizon case (T =∞)
In this subsection, we further assume that the system is time-invariant. Hence,
the matrices Ait, B
i
t, C
i
t , A
0
t , B
1,i
t , B
2,i
t , Dt, E
1,i
t , E
2,i
t , Q
i
t, R
i
t, K
i
t , L
i
t are
all assumed to be independent of the time variable t (hence the subscript t is
dropped from these matrices). Recall that βi ∈ [0, 1), for all i ∈ [1, N ], in the
infinite-horizon case.
Assumption 4.3. (i) A0 is stable, (Ai, Bi) is stabilizable, for all i ∈ [1, N ]
(ii) (y−1, X0), W0,W1, . . . , ξ0, ξ1, . . . are mutually independent and have finite
second-order moments (y−1 and X0 need not be independent)
(iii) (W 0t )t∈[0,∞), (ξt)t∈[0,∞) each is independent and identically distributed
(iid).
Consider an independent exogenous sequence (zt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment
variables with a given probability distribution ζ ∈ P(Y[−1,∞)) satisfying
supt∈[−1,∞)E(|zt|2) < ∞. An optimal strategy minimizing EζJ i(si, ·) over
si ∈ Si is given by
uit = s
i
t(I
i
t , Zt−1) = F
ixit +
∑
n∈[0,∞)
GinE(zt+n|Zt−1) +Hi, t ∈ [0,∞)
where F i, (Gin)n∈[0,∞), H
i are constants of appropriate dimensions, which are
pre-computable independently of the sequence (zt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment vari-
ables; see Appendix.
Consider now a joint strategy s = (si)i∈[1,N ] ∈ S where the sequence
(yt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment variables generated under s has the probability dis-
tribution ζs and supt∈[−1,∞)E(|yt|2) < ∞ (y−1 is given). The joint strategy s
is a subjective equilibrium if, for each i ∈ [1, N ], si minimizes EζsJ i(si, ·), e.g.,
sit(I
i
t , Yt−1) = F
ixit +
∑
n∈N0
GinE(yt+n|Yt−1) +Hi, t ∈ [0,∞) (4.14)
where
yt =Dx
0
t +
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
E1,j
(
F jxjt +
∑
n∈N0
GjnE(yt+n|Yt−1) +Hj
)
+
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
E2,jxjt + ξt
(4.15)
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x0t+1 =A
0x0t +
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
B1,j
(
F jxjt +
∑
n∈N0
GjnE(yt+n|Yt−1) +Hj
)
+
1
N
∑
j∈[1,N ]
B2,jxjt + w
0
t
(4.16)
xjt+1 =A
jxjt +B
j
(
F jxjt +
∑
n∈N0
GjnE(yt+n|Yt−1) +Hj
)
+ Cjyt + w
j
t , j ∈ [1, N ].
(4.17)
Therefore, a subjective equilibrium can be obtained via (4.14) provided a
sequence (yt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment variables satisfying (4.15)-(4.17) and
supt∈[−1,∞)E(|yt|2) < ∞, called equilibrium environment variables, exists.
Next, we introduce a set of assumptions to ensure the existence of equilibrium
environment variables.
We rewrite (4.15)-(4.17) in the vector form
yt =DXt +
∑
n∈[0,∞)
GpnE(yt+n|Yt−1) +Hp + ξt (4.18)
Xt+1 =AXt +
∑
n∈[0,∞)
GXn E(yt+n|Yt−1) +HX + Cyt +Wt (4.19)
where D, (Gpn)n∈[0,∞), Hp, A, (GXn )n∈[0,∞), HX , C are some constants of ap-
propriate dimensions. Taking the expectation of both sides of (4.18)-(4.19)
shows that the existence of equilibrium environment variables requires a solu-
tion (yˆt)t∈[0,∞) to the infinite system of linear equations, for t ∈ [0,∞),
yˆt =DXˆt +
∑
n∈[0,∞)
Gpnyˆt+n +Hp + ξˆ0 (4.20)
Xˆt+1 =AXˆt +
∑
n∈[0,∞)
GXn yˆt+n +HX + Cyˆt + Wˆ0 (4.21)
where Xˆ0 = E(X0). Accordingly, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.4. The infinite system of linear equations (4.20)-(4.21) has a
unique solution (yˆt)t∈[0,∞) for any Xˆ0, which will necessarily be in the form
yˆt = atXˆ0 + bt, t ∈ [0,∞) (4.22)
where (at)t∈[0,∞), (bt)t∈[0,∞) are assumed to be uniformly bounded and de-
pend only on the constants D, (Gpn)n∈[0,∞), Hp, ξˆ0, A, (GXn )n∈[0,∞), HX , C, Wˆ0.
Under Assumption 4.4, the conditional expectations of equilibrium environ-
ment variables satisfying (4.18)-(4.19), if exist, are given by
E(yt+k|Yk−1) = atE(Xk|Yk−1) + bt, t ∈ [0,∞), k ∈ [0,∞). (4.23)
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This prompts us to introduce the independent exogenous environment variables
(y¯t)t∈[−1,∞) generated by the recursion, for t ∈ [0,∞),
y¯t =DX¯t + GpE(X¯t|Y¯t−1) + Hˇp + ξ¯t (4.24)
X¯t+1 =AX¯t + GXE(X¯t|Y¯t−1) + HˇX + Cy¯t + W¯t (4.25)
where Gp := ∑n∈[0,∞) Gpnan, Hˇp := ∑n∈[0,∞) Gpnbn + Hp,
GX := ∑n∈[0,∞) GXn an, HˇX := ∑n∈[0,∞) GXn bn + HX ,
(y¯−1, X¯0, (ξ¯)t∈[0,∞), (W¯ )t∈[0,∞)) is distributed identically to (y−1, X0,
(ξ)t∈[0,∞), (W )t∈[0,∞)) and Y¯t−1 = (y¯k)k∈[−1,t).
By construction, the environment variables
(y¯t)t∈[−1,∞) generated by (4.24)-(4.25) satisfy (4.18)-(4.19); hence the en-
vironment variables (y¯t)t∈[−1,∞) are equilibrium environment variables,
provided supt∈[−1,∞)E(|y¯t|2) <∞.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the infinite-horizon linear quadratic problem of this
subsection. If Assumption 4.3-4.4 hold and (y¯t)t∈[−1,∞) generated by (4.24)-
(4.25) satisfies supt∈[−1,∞)E(|y¯t|2) < ∞, there exists a subjective equilibrium
strategy s ∈ S defined by
sit(I
i
t , Yt−1) = F
ixit +G
i ˆ¯Xt|t−1(Yt−1) + Hˇ
i, i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [0,∞) (4.26)
where Gi :=
∑
n∈[0,∞)G
i
nan, Hˇ
i :=
∑
n∈[0,∞)G
i
nbn+H
i, and ˆ¯Xt|t−1(·) denotes
the state estimator mapping Y¯t−1 7→ E(X¯t|Y¯t−1) based on (4.24)-(4.25). If
there are sets of identical DMs, there exists a symmetric subjective equilibrium
s ∈ S such that identical DMs have identical strategies at s, i.e., si = sj, if
DMi and DMj are identical.
Proof. Proof The assumptions and the discussion preceding the theorem ensures
that the environment variables generated by the joint strategy s defined by
(4.26) are equilibrium environment variables (which are distributed identically
to the independent exogenous environment variables generated by (4.24)-(4.25)).
The last part follows from the fact that identical DMs have identical opti-
mal responses to any independent exogenous sequence of environment variables.
This proves the theorem.
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.2 constructs a subjective equilibrium under the
unique solvability of (4.20)-(4.21) for any Xˆ0 and the uniform boundedness
of the second moments of the environment variables. These conditions
cannot be relaxed as long as we insist on the existence of an equilibrium
(with environment variables having uniformly bounded second-order moments)
for every initial state distribution. The uniform boundedness of the second
moments of the environment variables generated under (4.26) can be en-
sured if the closed-loop dynamics (identical to (4.24)-(4.25)) are stable. The
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closed-loop stability will be discussed in more detail in the Gaussian case shortly.
We now turn our attention to the Gaussian case where all primitive random
variables y−1, X0, (ξ)t∈[0,∞) ,(W )t∈[0,∞) are Gaussian. In this case, the state
estimator ˆ¯Xt|t−1(·) can be implemented as the following Kalman filter, for t ∈
[0,∞),
ˆ¯Xt+1|t =A ˆ¯Xt|t−1 + GX ˆ¯Xt|t−1 + HˇX + Cy¯t + Wˆ0
+AΣt|t−1D′(DΣt|t−1D′ + cov(ξ0))−1(y¯t − (D + Gp) ˆ¯Xt|t−1 − Hˇp − ξˆ0)
(4.27)
Σt+1|t =A
(
Σt|t−1 − Σt|t−1D′(DΣt|t−1D′ + cov(ξ0))−1DΣt|t−1
)A′ + cov(W0)
(4.28)
where Σt|t−1 := cov(X¯t|Y¯t−1) (cov(ξ0) will be assumed invertible). In this spe-
cial case, we will pursue the existence of a stationary subjective equilibrium,
i.e., a subjective equilibrium at which the environment variables are stationary.
The stationarity of the environment variables (y¯t)t∈[−1,∞) generated by
(4.24)-(4.25) coupled with the estimator (4.27)-(4.28) can be established by
showing the stationarity of ((X¯t,
ˆ¯Xt|t−1))t∈[0,∞). For this, we assume that
E(X¯0) =
ˆ¯X0 and Σ0|−1 = Σ where
ˆ¯X0 and Σ satisfy
ˆ¯X0 =(A+ GX + C(D + Gp)) ˆ¯X0 + HˇX + C(Hˇp + ξˆ0) + Wˆ0 (4.29)
Σ =A(Σ− ΣD′(DΣD′ + cov(ξ0))−1DΣ)A′ + cov(W0). (4.30)
This ensures E(X¯t) =
ˆ¯X0 and Σt|t−1 = Σ, for all t ∈ [0,∞). With this, we
write the dynamics of (X¯t,
ˆ¯Xt|t−1) in the form(
X¯t+1 − ˆ¯X0
X¯t+1 − ˆ¯Xt+1|t
)
=Acl
(
X¯t − ˆ¯X0
X¯t − ˆ¯Xt|t−1
)
+ Bcl
(
W¯t − Wˆ0
ξ¯t − ξˆ0
)
where
Acl :=
( A+ CD + GX + CGp −GX − CGp
0 A−AΣD′(DΣD′ + cov(ξ0))−1D
)
(4.31)
Bcl :=
(
I C
I −AΣD′(DΣD′ + cov(ξ0))−1
)
.
Since Σ is also the unconditional covariance of X¯t − ˆ¯Xt|t−1, for all t ∈ [0,∞),
we write
cov
(
X¯t+1 − Xˆ0
X¯t+1 − ˆ¯Xt+1|t
)
=
(
Θt+1 Σ
Σ Σ
)
= Acl
(
Θt Σ
Σ Σ
)
(Acl)′+Bclcov
(
W0
ξ0
)
(Bcl)′
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where Θt := cov(X¯t). To ensure the stationarity of (X¯t,
ˆ¯Xt|t−1), we assume that
Θ0 = Θ where Θ satisfies(
Θ Σ
Σ Σ
)
= Acl
(
Θ Σ
Σ Σ
)
(Acl)′ + Bclcov
(
W0
ξ0
)
(Bcl)′. (4.32)
As a result, we have E(X¯t − Xˆ0) = E(X¯t − ˆ¯Xt|t−1) = 0 and
E


(
X¯t − Xˆ0
X¯t − ˆ¯Xt|t−1
)
,
(
X¯k − Xˆ0
X¯k − ˆ¯Xk|k−1
)T = (Acl)t−k
(
Θ Σ
Σ Σ
)
for all 0 ≤ k ≤ t < ∞. This implies the stationarity of (X¯t, ˆ¯Xt|t−1)t∈[0,∞)
hence the stationarity of the environment variables (y¯t)t∈[−1,∞) (under the as-
sumptions we made thus far) and leads to the following corollary to Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.1. Consider the infinite-horizon linear quadratic Gaussian prob-
lem of this subsection. Let Assumption 4.3-4.4 hold and assume further that
Acl is stable and cov(ξ0) ≻ 0. If X0 ∼ N (Xˆ0,Θ), E(X0|Y−1) ∼ N (Xˆ0,Θ − Σ)
where Xˆ0, Σ, Θ solve (4.29), (4.30), (4.32), there exists a stationary subjective
equilibrium strategy s ∈ S defined by (4.26)-(4.28). If there are sets of identical
DMs, there exists a symmetric stationary subjective equilibrium s ∈ S such that
identical DMs have identical strategies at s, i.e., si = sj, if DMi and DMj are
identical.
Remark 4.3. Implicit in the steady-state initialization condition X0 ∼
N (Xˆ0,Θ), E(X0|Y−1) ∼ N (Xˆ0,Θ − Σ) is that there exist Xˆ0, Σ  0, Θ  Σ
solving (4.29), (4.30), (4.32), which can be established under reasonable assump-
tions ensuring closed-loop stability. Note that, since A0 is stable, A would be
stable if Ai + BiF i, i ∈ [1, N ] are stable, for all i ∈ [1, N ]. In other words, A
would be stable if each DM’s own state dynamics (as the environment variables
are seen as external inputs) is stabilized by its own control strategy. However,
the internal dynamics of the environment variables and each DM’s own state
dynamics are coupled in a feedback loop. The strategies of DMs designed to opti-
mize their individual objectives by viewing the process of environment variables
as independent and exogenous cannot be expected to stabilize this interconnected
feedback system. The overall stability of such an interconnected system (of sta-
ble subsystems) can be guaranteed under a condition of weak coupling, i.e., the
coefficients C1, . . . , CN , (R1)−1, . . . , (RN )−1 are sufficiently small, which makes
C,GX sufficiently small. This smallness of these coefficients de-emphasizes the
role of the environment variables on the state dynamics as well as the cost func-
tions of all DMs. This weak coupling condition along with the conditions for
the stability of A renders Acl in (4.31) stable7, which guarantees the existence
of Xˆ0, Σ  0, Θ  Σ solving (4.29), (4.30), (4.32).
7The stability of A implies the stability of A−AΣ¯D′(DΣ¯D′ +Ψ)−1D; see Section 4.4. in
Anderson and Moore (1979)
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The condition that the system is initially at steady-state is clearly a strong
one; however, this condition is necessary unless the environment variables can
be stationary without the system states being stationary. It appears that the
conditions of Corollary 4.1 cannot be relaxed in a significant way as long as we
insist on a stationary equilibrium. A possible alternative setting where steady-
state initialization is not required would be the average cost setting.
4.3 Case of countably infinite set of identical DMs
We adopt the infinite horizon setup of the previous subsection and consider a
countable set (DMi)i∈N of identical DMs. The matrices A
i, Bi, Qi, Ri, Ki,
Li are all assumed to be independent of the index i (hence the superscript i is
dropped from these matrices), and the matrices Ci are assumed to satisfy Ci =
0, for all i ∈ N, i.e., the individual state dynamics are not directly controlled
through the environment variables. Furthermore, the environment variable at
each time t ∈ [0,∞) is determined by the empirical average of the decisions as
well as the states:
yt = lim sup
N¯→∞
1
N¯
∑
j∈[1,N¯ ]
(E1ujt + E
2xjt ) + ξt
where E1, E2 are constants of appropriate dimension. In addition, we
strengthen Assumption 4.3 as follows.
Assumption 4.5. (i) (A,B) is stabilizable
(ii) y−1, x
1
0, x
2
0, . . . , w
1
0 , w
2
0, . . . , w
1
1 , w
2
1, . . . , ξ0, ξ1, . . . are mutually indepen-
dent and have finite second-order moments
(iii) (xi0)i∈N, (w
i
t)i∈N,t∈[0,∞), (ξt)t∈[0,∞) each is iid.
Consider an independent exogenous sequence (zt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment
variables which is iid with finite second-order moments and distribution ζ. As in
the previous cases, suppose that each DMi instead aims to minimize EζJ
i(si, ·)
over si ∈ Si. An optimal strategy for each DMi is obtained as
uit = s
i
t(I
i
t , Zt−1) = Fx
i
t +GE(z0) +H (4.33)
where F , G :=
∑
n∈[0,∞)Gn, H are constants of appropriate dimensions, which
are pre-computable independently of the sequence (zt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment
variables; see Appendix.
Consider now a joint strategy s = (si)i∈N ∈ S such that the sequence
(yt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment variables generated under s is iid with distribu-
tion ζs (E(|yt|2) = E(|y−1|2) <∞, for all t ∈ [0,∞)). The joint strategy s is a
subjective equilibrium if each si minimizes EζsJ
i(si, ·), e.g.,
sit(I
i
t , Yt−1) = Fx
i
t +GE(y0) +H (4.34)
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where
yt =(E
1F + E2) lim sup
N¯→∞
1
N¯
∑
j∈[1,N¯ ]
xjt + E
1GE(y0) + E
1H + ξt (4.35)
xjt+1 =Ax
j
t +B(Fx
j
t +GE(y0) +H) + w
j
t , j ∈ N. (4.36)
Therefore, a subjective equilibrium can be con-
structed via (4.34) provided an iid sequence
(yt)t∈[−1,∞) of environment variables satisfying (4.35)-(4.36) (as a ran-
dom sequence) can be obtained. Due to Assumption 4.5, (xit)i∈N generated by
(4.36) would be iid with finite second-order moments, for any t ∈ [0,∞). As a
result, we would have lim supN¯→∞
1
N¯
∑
j∈[1,N¯ ] x
j
t = E(x
1
t ), for any t ∈ [0,∞),
and
yt =(E
1F + E2)E(x1t ) + E
1GE(y0) + E
1H + ξt
E(x1t+1) =AE(x
1
t ) +B(FE(x
1
t ) +GE(y0) +H) + E(w
1
t ).
Thus, if the linear equations
yˆ0 =(E
1F + E2)xˆ0 + E
1Gyˆ0 + E
1H + ξˆ0 (4.37)
xˆ0 =Axˆ0 + B(F xˆ0 +Gyˆ0 +H) + wˆ
1
0 . (4.38)
have a solution (yˆ0, xˆ0) and (E(y−1), E(x
1
0)) = (yˆ0, xˆ0), then the environment
variables generated by the strategies
uit = s
i
t(I
i
t , Yt−1) = Fx
i
t +Gyˆ0 +H, i ∈ N (4.39)
would be iid with finite second-order moments and satisfy (4.35)-(4.36). This
leads to the following result.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the infinite-horizon linear quadratic problem of this
section with a countably infinite set of identical DMs. Let Assumption 4.5 hold.
If (E(y−1), E(x
1
0)) = (yˆ0, xˆ0) where (yˆ0, xˆ0) solves (4.37)-(4.38), there exists a
symmetric stationary subjective equilibrium strategy s ∈ S defined by (4.39).
Proof. Proof The result follows from the discussion preceding the theorem.
Remark 4.4. In the case where the environment variables are determined by
the average decisions of a countable set of identical DMs, no individual DM
can change the sequence of environment variables by unilaterally deviating
to an alternative strategy; therefore, a subjective equilibrium is also a Nash
equilibrium, which is in fact a mean-field equilibrium Huang et al. (2007),
Lasry and Lions (2007), Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988).
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5 Conclusion
We presented a generalization of the concept of price-taking equilibrium to gen-
eral stochastic dynamic games, called subjective equilibrium. At a subjective
equilibrium, players optimize their long-term cost with respect to their beliefs
of exogenous uncertainty in the environment variables while their beliefs being
consistent with the true distribution of the environment variables. We estab-
lished general existence of subjective equilibrium in mixed and behavior strate-
gies when all state, control, disturbance, and environment variables belong to
finite sets. In the linear-quadratic case, we derived explicit conditions for the
existence of subjective equilibrium in pure strategies. In both cases, we showed
the near person-by-person optimality of subjective equilibrium in large anony-
mous games. Devising learning methods that lead to subjective equilibria in
stochastic dynamic games remains as a significant future research topic.
6 Appendix
DM’s optimal response to independent exogenous environment variables in lin-
ear quadratic problems
We drop the superscript i and derive an optimal response for a generic
DM with respect to independent exogenous environment variables (zt)t∈[−1,T )
satisfying supt∈[−1,T )E(|zt|2) < ∞. DM has the knowledge of the distribution
of (zt)t∈[−1,T ) and has access to the realizations Zt−1 = (zk)k∈[−1,t) at time
t ∈ [0, T ) prior to choosing ut. For any random vector ζt, we use the notation
ζˆt = E(ζt) and ζˆt|k = E(ζt|Zk). Assumption 4.1 holds in the finite-horizon case,
whereas Assumption 4.3 holds in the infinite-horizon case. By completing the
squares, we write DM’s undiscounted cost at time t ∈ [0, T ) as
ct(xt, ut, zt) = c˜t(xt, ut, zt)− |zt|2LtQ−1t Lt+KtR−1t Kt
where
c˜t(xt, ut, zt) := |xt +Q−1t Ltzt|2Qt + |ut +R−1t Ktzt|2Rt .
Since E
(∑
t∈[0,T ) β
t|zt|2KtQ−1t Kt+LtR−1t Lt
)
is finite and independent of DM’s
strategy, we assume that DM’s undiscounted cost function at time t ∈ [0, T )
is c˜t without loss of generality.
DM’s optimal response in the finite-horizon case can be obtained using the
main result in Duncan and Pasik-Duncan (2012) which studies the finite-horizon
linear quadratic control problem with arbitrary correlated noise; however, for
completeness, we provide a brief derivation of DM’s optimal response below.
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7 Finite-horizon case
We define DM’s cost-to-go functions as, for all k ∈ [0, T ] and (Ik, Zk−1) ∈
Ik × Y[−1,k),
Vk(Ik, Zk−1) := min
sk,...,sT−1
E
( ∑
t∈[k,T )
βt−k c˜t(xt, ut, zt) + β
T−kcT (xT )
∣∣∣Ik, Zk−1
)
, k ∈ [0, T )
with VT (IT , ZT−1) := cT (xT ), where un = sn(In, Zn−1), sn : (In,Y
[−1,n))→ U,
for n ∈ [k, T ). These cost-to-go functions satisfy, for k ∈ [0, T ),
Vk(Ik, Zk−1) =min
sk
E
(
c˜k(xk, uk, zk) + βVk+1(Ik+1, Zk)|Ik, Zk−1
)
. (7.1)
As an induction hypothesis, assume that Vk+1 has the following form, for k ∈
[0, T ),
Vk+1(Ik+1, Zk) = |xk+1|2Mk+1 + 2x′k+1Nk+1(Zk) +Ok+1(Zk) (7.2)
where Mk+1  0 is an appropriate dimensional matrix, Nk+1, Ok+1 are appro-
priate dimensional functions of Zk. VT satisfies this hypothesis with MT = QT ,
NT = 0, OT = 0. The minimizing control in (7.1) is obtained as
uk = sk(Ik, Zk−1) := Fkxk +Gk,kzˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1) (7.3)
where
Fk =− βS−1k B′kMk+1Ak (7.4)
Gk,k =− S−1k (Kk + βB′kMk+1Ck) (7.5)
H˜k(Zk−1) =− βS−1k B′k(Nˆk+1|k−1 +Mk+1wˆk) (7.6)
Sk =Rk + βB
′
kMk+1Bk. (7.7)
Substituting the minimizing control (7.3)-(7.7) in (7.1)-(7.2) results in
Vk(Ik, Zk−1) =|xk|2Qk + |Fkxk +Gk,kzˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)|2Rk
+ 2zˆ′k|k−1(Kk(Fkxk +Gk,kzˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)) + Lkxk)
+ 2E(|zk|2KkQ−1k Kk+LkR−1k Lk |Zk−1)
+ βE(|(Ak +BkFk)xk +Bk(Gk,k zˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)) + Ckzk + wk|2Mk+1 |Zk−1)
+ βE(2((Ak +BkFk)xk +Bk(Gk,k zˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)) + Ckzk + wk)
′Nk+1(Zk)|Zk−1)
+ βE(Ok+1(Zk)|Zk−1). (7.8)
Grouping the constant, linear, and quadratic terms in xk for fixed Zk−1, we
rewrite Vk(Ik, Zk−1) as
Vk(Ik, Zk−1) =|xk|2Mk + 2x′kNk(Zk−1) +Ok(Zk−1)
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where
Mk =Qk + βA
′
k(Mk+1 − βMk+1BkS−1k B′kMk+1)Ak (7.9)
Nk(Zk−1) =β(Ak +BkFk)
′Nˆk+1|k−1 + vˆk|k−1 (7.10)
vk =(F
′
kKk + Lk)zk + β(Ak +BkFk)
′Mk+1(Ckzk + wk) (7.11)
Ok(Zk−1) =βOˆk+1|k−1 + λˆk|k−1 (7.12)
λk =|Gk,k zˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)|2Rk + 2z′kKk(Gk,k zˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1))
+ |zk|2KkQ−1k Kk+LkR−1k Lk + β|Bk(Gk,k zˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)) + Ckzk + wk|
2
Mk+1
+ 2β(Bk(Gk,k zˆk|k−1 + H˜k(Zk−1)) + Ckzk + wk)
′Nk+1(Zk).
(7.13)
The recursion (7.9) is the well-known Riccati difference equation for discrete
time linear quadratic problems (without the environment variables), Nk(Zk−1)
is obtained from the right hand side of (7.8) by collecting the linear terms in
xk for fixed Zk−1 and using RkFk + βB
′
kMk+1(Ak +BkFk) = 0, and Ok(Zk−1)
equals the right hand side of (7.8) for xk = 0. Since Vk(Ik, Zk−1) satisfies the
induction hypothesis, an optimal strategy for DM is given by (7.3). This optimal
strategy is rewritten as, for k ∈ [0, T ),
sk(Ik, Zk−1) =Fkxk +
∑
t∈[k,T )
Gk,tzˆt|k−1 +Hk
where
Gk,k =− S−1k (Kk + βB′kMk+1Ck)
Gk,t =− βS−1k B′k(Φk,tMt+1Ct +Φk,t−1(F ′tKt + Lt)), t ∈ [k + 1, T )
Hk =− βS−1k B′k
∑
t∈[k,T )
Φk,tMt+1wˆt
Φk,k =I, Φk,t =
∏
n∈[k+1,t]
β(An +BnFn)
′, t ∈ [k + 1, T ).
8 Infinite-horizon case
Recall that At, Bt, Ct,Kt, Lt, Qt, Rt are independent of t (hence the subscript t
is dropped) and β ∈ (0, 1).
Let J∗k (xk, Zk−1) denote DM’s optimal cost for the infinite-horizon problem
starting from (xk, Zk−1) at time k ∈ [0,∞). For any T˜ ∈ N, let J∗k,T˜ (xk, Zk−1)
denote DM’s optimal cost for the finite-horizon version of the problem starting
from (xk, Zk−1) at time k ∈ [0,∞) and running over the horizon [k, T˜ ) (with no
terminal cost). We have, for k ∈ [0,∞),
J∗k,k+1(xk, Zk−1) ≤ J∗k,k+2(xk, Zk−1) ≤ · · · ≤ J∗k (xk, Zk−1) <∞
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where J∗k (xk, Zk−1) < ∞ is due to the stabilizability of (A,B) and
supt∈[0,∞)E(|zt|2) < ∞. Hence, for any k ∈ [0,∞) and (xk, Zk−1),
limT˜→∞ J
∗
k,T˜
(xk, Zk−1) = J
∗
k,∞(xk, Zk−1) for some J
∗
k,∞(xk, Zk−1) ≤
J∗k (xk, Zk−1). Note that
J∗
k,T˜
(xk, Zk−1) = |xk|2Mk + 2x′kNk(Zk−1) +Ok(Zk−1)
where Mk, Nk(Zk−1), Ok(Zk−1), k ∈ [0,∞), are generated by the backward
recursions (7.9)-(7.13) with the boundary conditions MT˜ = NT˜ = OT˜ = 0.
This implies that, for any fixed k ∈ [0,∞) and Zk−1, Mk, Nk(Zk−1), Ok(Zk−1)
converge to some finite values as T˜ →∞.
It is well known that, as T˜ → ∞, Mk for any fixed k ∈ [0,∞) tends to the
unique solution M  0 of the algebraic Riccati equation
M =Q+ βA′(M − βMBS−1B′M)A (8.1)
within the set of positive semi-definite matrices since (A,B) is stabilizable and
(A,Q1/2) is detectable. Therefore, as T˜ → ∞, Fk, Gk,k, Sk for any fixed
k ∈ [0,∞) introduced in (7.4)-(7.7) converge to
F :=− βS−1B′MA
G :=− S−1(K + βB′MC)
S :=R+ βB′MB
respectively, where F renders the matrix
√
β(A+BF ) asymptotically stable. It
follows from (7.9)-(7.13) that, as T˜ → ∞, Nk(Zk−1), H˜k(Zk−1), Ok(Zk−1) for
any fixed k ∈ [0,∞) and Zk−1 tend to
Nk,∞(Zk−1) :=
∑
n∈[0,∞)
(β(A+BF )′)n ˆ¯vk+n|k−1
H˜k,∞(Zk−1) :=− βS−1B′
( ∑
n∈[0,∞)
(β(A+BF )′)nvˆk+n+1|k−1 +Mwˆ0
)
Ok,∞(Zk−1) =
∑
n∈[0,∞)
βn ˆ¯λk+n|k−1.
respectively, where
v¯k :=(F
′K + L)zk + β(A +BF )
′M(Czk + wk)
λ¯k :=|Gzˆk|k−1 + H˜k,∞(Zk−1)|2R + 2z′kK(Gzˆk|k−1 + H˜k,∞(Zk−1))
+ |zk|2KQ−1K+LR−1L + β|B(Gzˆk|k−1 + H˜k,∞(Zk−1)) + Czk + wk|2M
+ 2β(B(Gzˆk|k−1 + H˜k,∞(Zk−1)) + Czk + wk)
′Nk+1,∞(Zk).
Straightforward computation shows that (Jk,∞)k∈[0,∞) satisfy the Bellman
equations, i.e.,
J∗k,∞(xk, Zk−1) = |xk|2M + 2x′kNk,∞(Zk−1) +Ok,∞(Zk−1)
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= min
uk∈U
E(|xk +Q−1Lzk|2Q + |uk +R−1Kzk|2R + βJ∗k+1,∞(xk+1, Zk)|xk, Zk−1)
(8.2)
with the minimizing control
u∗k = s
∗
k(xk, Zk−1) := Fxk +Gzˆk|k−1 + H˜(Zk−1). (8.3)
Now, let Jk,s∗(xk, Zk−1) denote the cost achieved by the strategy s
∗ =
(s∗0, s
∗
1, . . . ) starting from (xk, Zk−1) at time k ∈ [0,∞). Let (x∗n+1, u∗n)n∈[k,T˜ )
be generated by (s∗n, zn)n∈[k,T˜ ) from (x
∗
k = xk, Zk−1). Since (J
∗
k,∞)k∈[0,∞) is
non-negative valued, we write
Jk,s∗(xk, Zk−1) ≤ lim
T˜→∞
E
( ∑
n∈[k,T˜ )
βn−k c˜n(x
∗
n, u
∗
n, zn) + β
T˜−kJ∗
T˜ ,∞
(x∗
T˜
, ZT˜−1)
∣∣∣∣xk, Zk−1
)
= lim
T˜→∞
E
( ∑
n∈[k,T˜−1)
βn−k c˜n(x
∗
n, u
∗
n, zn) + β
T˜−k−1J∗
T˜−1,∞
(x∗
T˜−1
, ZT˜−2)
∣∣∣∣xk, Zk−1
)
...
=J∗k,∞(xk, Zk−1)
where the equalities are obtained by repeated application of (8.2)-(8.3). There-
fore, the strategy s∗ is optimal.
Finally, consider any optimal strategy sˇ = (sˇ0, sˇ1, . . . ). We must have, for
k ∈ [0,∞),
J∗k (xk, Zk−1) = E(c˜k(xk, uˇk, zk) + βJ
∗
k+1(Axk +Buˇk + Czk + wk, Zk)|xk, Zk−1)
= min
uk
E(c˜k(xk, uk, zk) + βJ
∗
k+1(Axk +Buk + Czk + wk, Zk)|xk, Zk−1)
where uˇk = sˇk(xk, Zk−1) Since the minimum above is uniquely achieved by
s∗k(xk, Zk−1), we have sˇ = s
∗. The optimal strategy is rewritten as
u∗k = s
∗
k(xk, Zk−1) = Fxk +
∑
n∈[0,∞)
Gnzˆk+n|k−1 +H
where
G0 =− S−1(K + βB′MC)
Gn =− βS−1B′(β(A +BF )′)n((F ′K + L) + β(A+ BF )′MC), n ∈ N
H =− βS−1B′(I − β(A +BF )′)−1Mwˆ0.
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